In his State of the Municipio address of September 2013 (http://bit.ly/1w0yse9), José Luis Abarca Valázquez, Iguala’s fugitive municipal president, credited the low-level of crime in the municipality to the fine work of the municipal police. As evidence he cited reporting in the national daily Reforma and he reprinted a map of Guerrero published by Reforma in August of 2013 that showed Iguala nestled in a pocket of tranquility amid an otherwise lawless state.
This notion that Iguala was uniquely peaceful was an illusion, of course (and the idea that the municipal police were guardians of the law is perverse). But it was an illusion that required the complicity of many people to perpetuate. The reporting on Iguala that has appeared since the Ayotzinapa incident has focused on Abarca and his close affinal ties to known members of Guerreros Unidos. In his absence, attention seems to be shifting to the governor, more as a target of convenience than because of any evidence. But the rise of Guerreros Unidos in Iguala involved far more than the negligence of the governor and the collusion of the alcalde.
In fact, Guerreros Unidos controlled Iguala well before Abarca took office in July 2012. By the summer of 2012 Iguala was already established as the base of operations from which Guerreros Unidos gunmen fought a bitter three-sided war against La Familia Michoacana and Los Rojos. The basic territorial divisions that existed in 2012 have been consolidated in the intervening years but not significantly changed. La Familia dominates the municipios along the eastern edge of Tierra Caliente (Arcelia, San Miguel Totolapan), with Teloloapan forming a peninsula that juts into Guerreros Unidos territory to the east. Through 2012 and 2013 Guerreros Unidos fought bitterly to evict La Familia from other municipios of El Norte, establishing “community policing” groups in the muncipios of Apaxtla, Cuetzala, and Cocula after the municipal police of all three jurisdictions were eviscerated in the fighting. Guerreros Unidos drove rivals out of all municipios in El Norte except Teloloapan, which remains a battleground. Indeed, until the Ayotzinapa affair, the most notable story of 2014 in El Norte had been Guerreros Unidos’ ongoing efforts to dislodge La Familia from Teloloapan. It is a struggle that has made the city of Teloloapan probably the most violent spot in the state.
In Taxco, Iguala, Tepecuacuilco, Huitzuco, and Atenango del Río, the fighting mostly pitted Los Rojos against Guerreros Unidos but this was mostly concluded by 2012. La Familia had earlier been active in these municipios but they were driven west leaving Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos a clear field. The most bitterly contested locations included the affluent tourist center of Taxco and the portion of the Acapulco-Mexico Autopista that runs through El Norte. By the summer of 2012 Guerreros Unidos had the upper hand in both of these areas. Since 2012, Chilpancingo and Zumpango del Río have been the center of operations for Los Rojos just as Iguala has been for Guerreros Unidos. Los Rojos has been weakened in 2014 and has faced internal schisms that have elevated levels of violence in Chilpancingo and Chilapa but Guerreros Unidos does not seem to be involved in these conflicts. Fighting between Guerreros Unidos and Los Rojos in the last couple of years has instead been prompted by Guerreros Unidos’ efforts to secure a foothold in the opium production zones south of the Río Balsas, in the municipios to the west and northwest of Chilpancingo. Like Teloloapan, the municipios of Eduardo Neri, Heliodoro Castillo, and San Miguel Totolapan have experienced exceptional levels of violence.
Exactly when and how the municipal police of Iguala became a de facto branch of Guerreros Unidos is not clear. Certainly they were operating in this capacity on December 7, 2013, when officers in 3 vehicles left their jurisdiction and appeared in Mextitlan, Teloloapan where they abducted 8 members of a family who were found dismembered the following day on a secondary highway in Ixcateopan (see http://bit.ly/1qNHFjM and http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/123084). In April 2013 the entire municipal police force of Cuetzala was captured by unknown gunmen and two of them appeared the next day, dead, in the same neighborhood on the west side of Iguala that has been the focus of the search for the missing Ayotzi (see http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=343149). Whether the municipal police of Iguala were involved in this incident is unknown; at a minimum, they helped foster an environment in Iguala that gave Guerreros Unidos a sanctuary that allowed them to operate freely and that provided a refuge from the violence found along the front lines.
In the last several years the number of homicide victims appearing in the streets of Iguala has been low compared to other cities in Guerrero. What makes the pattern seen in Iguala distinct is the relatively high proportion of murder victims who were buried in clandestine graves. As I noted in a previous post, this pattern is the hallmark of kidnapping operations. Kidnapping rings have clearly operated in Iguala without significant restraint. Though extortion rackets have not received much press coverage (they have become so routine as to go without saying throughout Guerrero) it is safe to assume that extortionists have had a free hand as well. For anyone paying attention to Guerrero over the last few years, it has been abundantly clear that the relatively low murder rate in Iguala has been a reflection of Guerrero Unidos’ unchallenged monopoly over kidnapping, extortion, and retail drug markets in Iguala. Abarca’s claim that Iguala had low crime rates, and that this reflected the hard work of the municipal police, was nonsense.
With Abarca in hiding and the municipal police force in detention there has been no public face for people to aim their outrage. Governor Aguirre has emerged as a target of opportunity and calls for him to resign have grown steadily louder and more insistent. I have not seen evidence that would point to Aguirre’s direct complicity with Guerreros Unidos, Abarca, or any other criminal group. He could be held guilty of neglect, of ignoring evidence that Iguala’s municipal government operated as an extension of Guerreros Unidos. But his guilt in this is surely no greater than the multitude of other officials who were in a position to know and to act. Those who immediately spring to mind include the commanders of the 27th Infantry Battalion and the Federal Police. State Police officials and the Ministerio Público knew as well. The national press is hardly blameless either. The map published by Reforma and the lack of serious reporting that it reflects likewise played a part in facilitating Guerreros Unidos in Iguala. The question that I keep coming back to is would it have mattered had any of these parties made a serious attempt to expose Guerreros Unidos?
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Iguala and Guerreros Unidos
In his State of the Municipio address of September 2013 (http://bit.ly/1w0yse9), José Luis Abarca Valázquez, Iguala’s fugitive municipal president, credited the low-level of crime in the municipality to the fine work of the municipal police. As evidence he cited reporting in the national daily Reforma and he reprinted a map of Guerrero published by Reforma in August of 2013 that showed Iguala nestled in a pocket of tranquility amid an otherwise lawless state.
This notion that Iguala was uniquely peaceful was an illusion, of course (and the idea that the municipal police were guardians of the law is perverse). But it was an illusion that required the complicity of many people to perpetuate. The reporting on Iguala that has appeared since the Ayotzinapa incident has focused on Abarca and his close affinal ties to known members of Guerreros Unidos. In his absence, attention seems to be shifting to the governor, more as a target of convenience than because of any evidence. But the rise of Guerreros Unidos in Iguala involved far more than the negligence of the governor and the collusion of the alcalde.
In fact, Guerreros Unidos controlled Iguala well before Abarca took office in July 2012. By the summer of 2012 Iguala was already established as the base of operations from which Guerreros Unidos gunmen fought a bitter three-sided war against La Familia Michoacana and Los Rojos. The basic territorial divisions that existed in 2012 have been consolidated in the intervening years but not significantly changed. La Familia dominates the municipios along the eastern edge of Tierra Caliente (Arcelia, San Miguel Totolapan), with Teloloapan forming a peninsula that juts into Guerreros Unidos territory to the east. Through 2012 and 2013 Guerreros Unidos fought bitterly to evict La Familia from other municipios of El Norte, establishing “community policing” groups in the muncipios of Apaxtla, Cuetzala, and Cocula after the municipal police of all three jurisdictions were eviscerated in the fighting. Guerreros Unidos drove rivals out of all municipios in El Norte except Teloloapan, which remains a battleground. Indeed, until the Ayotzinapa affair, the most notable story of 2014 in El Norte had been Guerreros Unidos’ ongoing efforts to dislodge La Familia from Teloloapan. It is a struggle that has made the city of Teloloapan probably the most violent spot in the state.
In Taxco, Iguala, Tepecuacuilco, Huitzuco, and Atenango del Río, the fighting mostly pitted Los Rojos against Guerreros Unidos but this was mostly concluded by 2012. La Familia had earlier been active in these municipios but they were driven west leaving Los Rojos and Guerreros Unidos a clear field. The most bitterly contested locations included the affluent tourist center of Taxco and the portion of the Acapulco-Mexico Autopista that runs through El Norte. By the summer of 2012 Guerreros Unidos had the upper hand in both of these areas. Since 2012, Chilpancingo and Zumpango del Río have been the center of operations for Los Rojos just as Iguala has been for Guerreros Unidos. Los Rojos has been weakened in 2014 and has faced internal schisms that have elevated levels of violence in Chilpancingo and Chilapa but Guerreros Unidos does not seem to be involved in these conflicts. Fighting between Guerreros Unidos and Los Rojos in the last couple of years has instead been prompted by Guerreros Unidos’ efforts to secure a foothold in the opium production zones south of the Río Balsas, in the municipios to the west and northwest of Chilpancingo. Like Teloloapan, the municipios of Eduardo Neri, Heliodoro Castillo, and San Miguel Totolapan have experienced exceptional levels of violence.
Exactly when and how the municipal police of Iguala became a de facto branch of Guerreros Unidos is not clear. Certainly they were operating in this capacity on December 7, 2013, when officers in 3 vehicles left their jurisdiction and appeared in Mextitlan, Teloloapan where they abducted 8 members of a family who were found dismembered the following day on a secondary highway in Ixcateopan (see http://bit.ly/1qNHFjM and http://suracapulco.mx/archivos/123084). In April 2013 the entire municipal police force of Cuetzala was captured by unknown gunmen and two of them appeared the next day, dead, in the same neighborhood on the west side of Iguala that has been the focus of the search for the missing Ayotzi (see http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=343149). Whether the municipal police of Iguala were involved in this incident is unknown; at a minimum, they helped foster an environment in Iguala that gave Guerreros Unidos a sanctuary that allowed them to operate freely and that provided a refuge from the violence found along the front lines.
In the last several years the number of homicide victims appearing in the streets of Iguala has been low compared to other cities in Guerrero. What makes the pattern seen in Iguala distinct is the relatively high proportion of murder victims who were buried in clandestine graves. As I noted in a previous post, this pattern is the hallmark of kidnapping operations. Kidnapping rings have clearly operated in Iguala without significant restraint. Though extortion rackets have not received much press coverage (they have become so routine as to go without saying throughout Guerrero) it is safe to assume that extortionists have had a free hand as well. For anyone paying attention to Guerrero over the last few years, it has been abundantly clear that the relatively low murder rate in Iguala has been a reflection of Guerrero Unidos’ unchallenged monopoly over kidnapping, extortion, and retail drug markets in Iguala. Abarca’s claim that Iguala had low crime rates, and that this reflected the hard work of the municipal police, was nonsense.
With Abarca in hiding and the municipal police force in detention there has been no public face for people to aim their outrage. Governor Aguirre has emerged as a target of opportunity and calls for him to resign have grown steadily louder and more insistent. I have not seen evidence that would point to Aguirre’s direct complicity with Guerreros Unidos, Abarca, or any other criminal group. He could be held guilty of neglect, of ignoring evidence that Iguala’s municipal government operated as an extension of Guerreros Unidos. But his guilt in this is surely no greater than the multitude of other officials who were in a position to know and to act. Those who immediately spring to mind include the commanders of the 27th Infantry Battalion and the Federal Police. State Police officials and the Ministerio Público knew as well. The national press is hardly blameless either. The map published by Reforma and the lack of serious reporting that it reflects likewise played a part in facilitating Guerreros Unidos in Iguala. The question that I keep coming back to is would it have mattered had any of these parties made a serious attempt to expose Guerreros Unidos?
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